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Abstract
The paper examines ways in which information
systems can and do misinform clients. Using a common
framework for understanding information systems, it
uncovers four primary (and eleven secondary) methods by
which systems can fail to inform. The paper uses research
conducted in a variety of fields.
Introduction
This paper lays groundwork for experimental research
into the human factors involved in the failure of
information systems to inform. Its purpose is to develop a
framework for this inquiry by drawing from research
findings in a variety of fields, such psychology,
journalism, and cybernetics. While this paper applies the
work to information systems, the work is applicable to all
the fields that endeavor to inform clients. These fields
collectively are known as Informing Science (Cohen,
1999).
Over 30 years ago, Ackoff’s (1967) suggested that
those designing information systems misinformed their
clients by building systems based on five unjustified
assumptions:
1. the critical deficiency under which most
managers operate is the lack of relevant
information,
2. managers request the information they need,
3. if managers had the information they want,
their decision making would improve,
4. better communication among managers
improves organizational  performance, and
5. managers need not understand how their
information system works, just how to use it.
This paper builds on Ackoff original theme, although
not his method. The theme of this paper is to show that
information systems can and do misinform their decision
maker clients and how this misinforming occurs.
The Traditional Framework of Information
Systems and its Problems
The traditional framework of information systems is
an application of the three-stage Systems model, shown in
Figure 1.  This, in one variant or another, is used in many
introduction to MIS texts to represent how inform comes
to be delivered to decision makers (for example, Cats-
Barril & Thomson, 1997; Stair & Reynolds, 1998).
The pervasiveness of this framework demonstrates
that, limitations and all, it has influenced the thinking of
those working in the field. To understand the research on
misinformation presented below, it is helpful to expand
this framework. In doing so, we expose often-unstated
steps and it is here where most problems occur.  Figure 2
shows such an expanded framework.
Here we explicitly point out that 1) reality and the
captured data are not the same, 2) decision making takes
place within a context (described in the paper), and 3)
only selected data are processed. In this way, the
framework clarifies that decision-making is only
indirectly influenced by reality; there are many steps that
separate reality from the decision-making process.
The author makes no claim that the framework shown in
Fig. 2 is new.  It isn’t.  Gupta (1996) for example uses it.
What is new is applying the framework as a means to
organize the types of errors that lead systems to
misinform their clients.
data ! processing of data ! information
Fig. 1. The simple three-stage framework of information delivery.
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Data Recording Stage – Type I Errors
Information systems do not deal with reality directly.
Data, as proxies of reality, are recorded for later
processing. A number of errors can and do occur in this
stage. This paper calls errors that occur in recording Type
I errors.
Type I errors have been studies in depth in two
separate and disparate arenas.  One of these arenas
follows the methodology of human factors research.
Researchers at Bell Laboratories noted that telephone
records were full of errors and asked “why”. They
determined that about 80% of all errors in new systems
are derived from data transcription alone (Mitchell, 1979;
Bailey, 1973; Manley, 1973). Type I errors are insidious
because, once errors have been introduced into a system,
they are inherited by all new systems that rely on those
data.
A second arena in which Type I errors have been
studied is the psychology of human attention and memory
mechanisms. People are not good at accurately recording
and reporting reality, as seen in eyewitness accounts
(Loftus, 1975, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1993, 1997). Justice
system research reports dire outcomes from police and
courts ignoring Type I errors and wrongly assuming that
their eyewitness testimony and old memories brought to
light by hypnosis accurately reflect reality. (Perdergrast,
1995; Rattner, 1988). For decision makers in other areas,
such as business, relying on mistaken memories have less
public consequences that are not as easily studied.
The above research on Type I errors show, in two
separate arenas, that people making good faith efforts to
accurately report and record reality fail.  Another category
of Type I errors occurs when people actively try to
misrepresent reality. This effect has been studied in the
news media (Solomon, 1999; Moorman, 1977).
Information systems that involve mudslinging with
out-and-out lying and other forms of misrepresenting
reality appear to be successful in political campaigns in
the United States.  However, the author has so far failed
to uncovered research into information systems that
deliberated misrepresent reality.
Processing Stage – Type II errors
In the processing stage, data are filtered and
summarized. We will call errors that occur at this stage
Type II errors.
Systems Bias. Information systems are designed and
used by people and so by nature are biased.  Information
systems occur at the intersection of technology and
human behavior. There are two categories of systems
bias: designer bias and end-user bias.
Systems bias is difficult to understand or perceive
because both the designer and end-user of the information
system make assumptions (often unknowingly) that
impacts the output of the information system. “The fish is
the last to see the water” (Gause & Weinberg, 1982).
Perhaps the most publicized instance of systems bias
is seen in the works of Geert Hofstede. Ethnographer
Hofstede (1980) carried out what is arguably the most
influential study of work and culture while employed by
IBM in the 1970’s. He became aware that his original
survey instrument could be biased by his own cultural
assumptions. To test whether he and his team biased the
results, in the 1980’s he arranged for his survey
instrument to be translated into other languages in a sort
of double-blind approach that isolated the product from
the original team. The results of that study (Hofstede,
1997, 1998) clearly demonstrated the impact of systems
bias, even in scientific endeavors.
System Designer Bias. Information systems that
create management reports require the selection and
filtering of data. They all possess Type II errors in that
their designers had to select filters. They, as we all, live in
the midst of hidden assumptions and so, despite their best
efforts to avoid bias, filter data for our system in ways
that reflect their bias. Builders of systems do not see or
understand their own bias as it is invisible to them.
One example of system bias can be seen in group
decision support systems (GDSS) that allow employees to
post their input anonymously (for example, O’Connor,
1999). Note that the concept that ideas from employees of
all ranks, sexes, and tenure with the company should be
considered equally on their merit is based in meritocratic
Western modes of thinking. Many other societies value
the thinking of selected individuals (such as the oldest)
with higher regard than others. Bias in GDSS has been
ignored by the MIS literature.
Chauvinism in design work is not limited to GDSS. In
his book on software interface design, Fernandes (1995)
explores this issue in great depth from the point of view
of making software that is independent of culture. He
points out that, due to the designers’ cultural assumptions,
the impact of the output on the user is sometimes different
from what the designer anticipated.  For example,
“standard” icons for mail and trash are meaningless in
places where the mail boxes and trash cans look different.
Nielsen (2000) used standard research techniques to
study how users actually perceive web sites. His research
on Web usability lead him to the same conclusion as
Fernandes. Web designs contain the bias of their
designers.  Designers need to understand the end-users,
their needs, and their assumptions to create successful
webs.
System Users’ Bias.  A second category of systems
bias involves end users. Type II bias is even more obvious
in systems that allow the end user to select what to report.
In this case, users bring to the system their own biases.
1058
Pre-conceived notions drive (or at least influence) the
discovery process. People tend to find what they are
looking for. This is not to say that drill-down features are
not useful.  Rather it is to point out that users need to
understand their own biases.
Data Smog.  The problem with data for most firms is
not lack of it, but too much of it. This phenomenon has
been variously name: “Data Smog” by David Shenk
(1997) and Data Deluge by John Gehl and Suzanne
Douglas (1999). Shenk views the phenomenon as a threat;
Gehl and Douglas, taking a McLuhan viewpoint, see it as
an opportunity.  (Shenk’s viewpoint is echoed from the
news reporting viewpoint by Sommerville (1999).
Decisionmaking Stage – Type III errors
Type III error are errors in interpretation of
information systems’ output. This type of error has been
studied in many other fields, but not in Information
Systems. One category of Type III errors comes from
assuming that decision makers are fully rational.
Search for Meaning. Groundbreaking research by
cognitive psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1980)
demonstrates clearly that decision makers are not rational
all the time. Changing the sequencing and framing of the
same facts can lead decision makers to make different
choices. The choice can be based more on how the
problem is framed in its presentation than on given facts
of the case. This lack of rationality is how trial lawyers
who argue the same facts can reach contrary conclusions.
Question framing also explains why political and other
polls are highly influenced by the wording and sequence
of poll items.
Another category of Type III error comes from
ignoring context. For the output of an information system
to be understood, it must be viewed within a context
(Checkland 1981; Winter, Brown and Checkland 1995;
Beer 1999). Indeed, the mathematical definition of
information is rooted in the ability of information to
change (the decision characteristics of) the receiver
(Shannon & Weaver, 1963).  For this to occur, the
decision maker must have a decision that needs to be
made, hence context. Yet, information systems
themselves do not commonly provide context.
For example, consider the output of an information
system that reports dropping sales from the Northwest
region this month. Without context, this “information”
might lead to concern that the Northwest region had a
problem. Now view that information in the following
context: Storms and flooding put the Northeast in crisis.
Workers cannot leave their homes.  Without the context,
the meaning of the information is lost and the information
could lead to misinformation.
Within a Social Context. The meaning of
information and information systems exists in a social
context.  Kling (1999) wrote “One key idea of social
informatics research is that the ‘social context’ of
information technology development and use plays a
significant role in influencing the ways that people use
information and technologies, and thus influences their
consequences for work, organizations, and other social
relationships.” Information systems created to serve one
purpose can be used for other, even contrary, purposes
and thus produce a Type III error.  For example, during
World War II, the United States Census data were used by
the military to round up Americans of Japanese ancestry.
Solving the Wrong Problem: Type IV Errors
No discussion of information systems errors would be
complete without mentioning the most widely
investigated, solving the wrong problem. A Standish
Group study (1998) indirectly cites getting this right as
the top factor in project success and failure. Industry
warhorses Donald Gause and Gerald Weinberg (1990)
point out that without end user involvement, most projects
are doomed to fail.
A quarter century ago, Lucas (1975) suggested
breaking with the strict systems development life cycle by
adding prototyping as a way to overcome systems
failures. More recently Beyer and Holtzblatt (1998)
recommended using ethnographic methods during the
requirements definition stage of systems to ensure solving
the right problem.
Conclusion
Table 1 summarizes the four types of errors in
Information System. Note that none of these are the types
of errors that are easily amenable to engineering
solutions.
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Error
Type Name
I inaccurate recording of data – transcription,
…
I inaccurate recording of data – memory
I inaccurate representation of data – deliberate
misrepresentation
II filtering of data – designer bias
II filtering of processes – designer bias
II filtering of data – end user bias
II filtering of data – data smog
III decision-making – misassumption of
rationality
III decision-making – ignoring context
III decision-making – misapplication of tool to
context
IV solving wrong problem
Table 1. The Four Types of Errors that Create
Misinforming Systems
The paper has studied ways in which information
systems misinform clients. We have shown that each of
the components in a common framework for
understanding information systems is associated with
types of errors. Using research findings conducted in a
variety of fields and using a variety of research methods,
this paper demonstrated four primary (and eleven
secondary) ways in which information systems can fail to
inform.
This work focuses on information systems. The work
can be expanded elsewhere to include other fields of
Informing Science, such as journalism.
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